Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with Anti-Discrimination Laws by Talesh, Shauhin A
 




     Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2015-33 
 
 
LEGAL INTERMEDIARIES:  
HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES CONSTRUCT THE 




Shauhin A. Talesh   
stalesh@law.uci.edu  







The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at: 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585715
Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance
Companies Construct the Meaning of
Compliance with Antidiscrimination Laws
SHAUHIN TALESH
Existing empirical research suggests that human resource officials, managers,
and in-house counsel influence the meaning of antidiscrimination law by
communicating an altered ideology of what civil rights laws mean that is
colored with managerial values. This article explores how insurance companies
play a critical and, as yet, unrecognized role in mediating the meaning
of antidiscrimination law through Employment Practice Liability Insurance
(EPLI). My analysis draws from, links, and contributes to two literatures
that examine organizational behavior in different ways: new institutional
organizational sociology studies of how organizations respond to legal regula-
tion and sociolegal insurance scholars’ research on how institutions govern
through risk. Through participant observation at EPLI conferences, interviews,
and content analysis of insurance loss prevention manuals, my study bridges
these two literatures and highlights how the insurance field uses a risk-based
logic to construct the threat of employment law and influence the form
of compliance from employers. Faced with uncertain legal risk concerning
potential discrimination violations, insurance institutions elevate the risk
and threat in the legal environment and offer EPLI and a series of risk-
management services that build discretion into legal rules and mediate the
nature of civil rights compliance. My data suggest that insurance risk-
management services may sometimes be compatible with civil rights goals of
improving equality, due process, and fair governance in workplace settings, but
at other times may simply make discrimination claims against employers more
defensible.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil rights and employment laws impose liability on employers for wrong-
ful employment practices and seek to protect an employee’s right to a
workplace free of discrimination and harassment. These laws recognize
that employees deserve recourse for acts of discrimination committed
against them and that monetary penalties are effective tools in deterring
such discrimination. Existing empirical research of employer responses to
antidiscrimination laws by new institutional organizational sociologists,
however, reveals that employers mediate what employment law means in
action. These studies show that ideas about law and compliance that
originate with the professions (managers, human resource officials, and
in-house lawyers) become institutionalized among employers and, over
time, generate a diffusion of new organizational practices that are influ-
enced by managerial values (Marshall 2005; Edelman, Fuller, and
Mara-Drita 2001). While new institutional scholars highlight how manag-
ers and human resource professionals mediate and managerialize law
through conferences, networking, and professional personnel literature,
they have yet to explore the role that insurance and, in particular, insur-
ance institutions, play in constructing the meaning of compliance with anti-
discrimination law.
This omission is significant because the vast majority of employers seek
ways to shift risk and responsibility away from themselves by purchasing
insurance. While most forms of business insurance explicitly exclude cover-
age for liability arising out of employment practices, the insurance industry in
the early 1990s introduced a product called Employment Practices Liability
Insurance (EPLI). EPLI filled this gap in coverage by providing employers
with the means to manage the perceived litigation risk associated with dis-
crimination, sexual harassment, and other breaches of employment law.
While there is some variation in policies, EPLI provides insurance defense
and indemnification coverage to employers for claims of discrimination (age,
race, sex, disability), wrongful termination, sexual harassment, and other
employment-related allegations made by employees, former employees, or
potential employees.1 Whereas previously employers exclusively bore these
damages payable to injured employees, EPLI now allows employers to pass
these costs on to insurance companies, who charge a premium to offset their
liability.
EPLI almost immediately enjoyed astonishing success (Gabel et al. 2001).
Since EPLI policies were first sold in 1991, the number of insurance compa-
nies offering EPLI policies has grown from five to over fifty-five (Betterley
Report 2012; Chaney 2001; Gibson 2000). The volume of business (measured
by the gross written premiums) for insurers offering EPLI is approximately
$1.6 billion in the United States, and $500 million outside the United States
(Betterley 2012). The majority of large employers have EPLI, and many
midsize business owners also purchase some form of EPLI (Betterley 2012).
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Moreover, coverage under EPLI has expanded over time as well. These
policies now cover retaliation, defamation, invasion of privacy, some inten-
tional acts, and sometimes punitive damages against employers. While EPLI
is an institutionalized practice among both insurers and insurance-related
institutions that offer, market, and sell this product, and among employers
who purchase this insurance, there has been little empirical research evalu-
ating how the insurance industry, through EPLI, constructs the meaning of
compliance with antidiscrimination law.
My theoretical framework for answering this question draws from two
literatures that examine organizational behavior and decision making in
different ways: (1) new institutional organizational sociology studies of how
organizations respond to legal regulation; and (2) sociolegal insurance schol-
ars’ studies of how institutions govern through risk. Whereas prior new
institutional studies focus on how the professions managerialize the meaning
of employment law (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001; Edelman,
Erlanger, and Lande 1993), insurance law scholars focus on how formal
considerations about risk direct organizational strategy and resources (Baker
and Simon 2002).
My study bridges these two literatures by exploring how insurance com-
panies and institutions, through EPLI and the accompanying risk-
management services that they offer, construct the threat of employment
law and try to influence the nature of civil rights compliance. Drawing
from participant observation and ethnographic interviews at EPLI confer-
ences across the country and content analysis of EPLI policies, loss pre-
vention manuals, EPLI industry guidelines, and webinars, my empirical
data suggest that insurance companies and institutions, through EPLI,
use a risk-based logic and institutionalize a way of thinking anchored
toward risk management and reduction. Faced with uncertain and unpre-
dictable legal risk concerning potential discrimination violations, insurance
institutions elevate the risk and threat in the legal environment and offer a
series of risk-management services that they argue will avert risk for
employers who purchase EPLI. Conferences, training programs, loss pre-
vention manuals, and insurance policy language provide an opportunity for
insurance field actors to build discretion into legal rules and recontextualize
antidiscrimination laws around a nonlegal risk logic that dominates dis-
course concerning what constitutes discrimination. In this setting, risk and
managerial values work in a complementary manner because my data
reveal that the insurance field uses risk-based logics to encourage employers
to engage in managerial responses such as developing policies and proce-
dures. While my data suggest EPLI and the series of risk-management
services offered with the insurance policy can potentially improve employ-
ment practices and compliance, it also suggests that EPLI risk-management
services may at times shape compliance in a way that leans more toward
making claims defensible rather than fostering a discrimination-free
workplace.
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NEW INSTITUTIONAL AND RISK-BASED APPROACHES TOWARD
STUDYING ORGANIZATIONS
New institutional organizational sociology and sociolegal insurance scholars
emphasize different mechanisms for explaining organizational behavior
and decision making. New institutional theories of law and organizations
examine organizational responses to the legal environment (Sutton et al.
1994; Dobbin et al. 1993). The civil rights movement and the mandates
of the 1960s altered organizations’ legal environments by raising societal
attention to equality, due process, and fair governance. Contrary to rational
approaches, institutional perspectives suggest organizations adopt a variety
of legal structures in response to institutionalized rules or normative practices
that have become widely accepted among organizational fields (Edelman
1990, 1992). The construct of an organizational field refers to the community
of organizations and affiliated entities, including suppliers, customers, and
competitors, that share common systems of meaning, values, and norms
(Scott 2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977).
New institutional organizational sociology studies reveal how law becomes
managerialized as values such as rationality, efficiency, and management
discretion operating within an organizational field influence the way in which
organizations understand law, legality, and compliance (Edelman, Fuller,
and Mara-Drita 2001). Prior new institutional research shows that the pro-
fessions are key carriers of ideas among and across organizational fields. In
particular, human resource officials, personnel managers, management con-
sultants, and in-house lawyers communicate ideas about law as they move
among organizations and participate in conferences, workshops, training
sessions, professional networking meetings, and publish professional person-
nel literature (Edelman et al. 2011; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001;
Abzug and Mezias 1993; Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993; Baron,
Dobbin, and Jennings 1986; Jacoby 1985). These forums offer opportunities
for the diffusion of new solutions to perceived managerial problems such as
the threat of employment lawsuits (Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999; Edelman,
Abraham, and Erlanger 1992). Existing empirical research reveals how
managerial conceptions of law broaden the term diversity in a way that
disassociates the term from its original goal of protecting civil rights
(Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001), transform sexual harassment
claims into personality conflicts (Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993),
deflect or discourage complaints rather than offer informal resolution
(Marshall 2005), and even shape the way public legal institutions such as
legislatures (Talesh 2009, 2014), courts (Edelman et al. 2011; Edelman 2005,
2007; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999), and arbitration forums (Talesh
2012) understand law and compliance.
Sociolegal insurance scholars explore how institutions—insurance or
otherwise—govern through risk (Baker and Simon 2002). Baker and Simon
refer to governing through risk as “the use of formal considerations about
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risk to direct organizational strategy and resources” (Baker and Simon 2002,
11). This concept simultaneously encompasses not only the use of risk-based
principles by insurance companies, but the use of insurance technologies and
concepts to govern risk outside of insurance institutions.
Empirical studies in the past twenty years reveal how the insurance indus-
try plays an active role in constructing the meaning of risk and responsibility
in different segments of society. Through policy language, pricing, and risk-
management services, liability insurance companies engage in loss prevention
and regulate the behavior of actors and organizations (Abraham 2013;
Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012; Baker and Griffith 2010; Baker 2005; Ericson,
Doyle, and Barry 2003; Heimer 2002). Insurance-as-governance studies high-
light how insurers manage moral hazard in property and fidelity relationships
(Heimer 1985), govern security in the home (O’Malley 1991), impact the
motion picture industry in the United States (Hubbart 1996–97), and influ-
ence risk-management approaches toward campus drinking (Simon 1994). In
the case of medical malpractice, insurance serves to shift risk and responsi-
bility away from doctors, however inflated the threat of medical malpractice
might be (Baker 2005). In other settings, insurance impacts insured behavior
much less. For example, although insurers offering directors and officers
insurance have an opportunity to influence the behavior of directors and
officers and discourage wrongful or even illegal behavior, they seldom do
(Baker and Griffith 2010).
Moving beyond insurance institutions and traditional settings where insur-
ance is sold, risk-based principles are increasingly incorporated into organi-
zational decision making and behavior (Baker and Simon 2002; Ewald 2002;
Heimer 2002). For example, social service agencies target at-risk children (US
Department of Health and Human Services 1994), community policing
approaches target high-risk areas (Ericson and Haggerty 1997), environmen-
tal engineers conduct risk assessments of hazardous waste sites and other
sources of environmental concern (Graham and Weiner 1995), and fraterni-
ties redefine gender relations in response to the risk of sexual harassment
(Simon 1994).
In sum, new institutional and insurance sociolegal scholars rely on differ-
ent theoretical approaches and, consequently, emphasize different mecha-
nisms for explaining organizational influence over law and society. However,
little new institutional research in this vein explores the role that insurance
and, in particular, insurance institutions, play in shaping the way in which
organizations understand law and compliance (cf. Schneiberg and Soule
2004; Schneiberg 2002). Moreover, new institutional scholars for the most
part have not evaluated the manner in which risk-based logics and principles
influence the way that professional intermediaries, such as the insurance
industry, discuss compliance with employment.2 Conversely, governing-
through-risk scholars have not explored the microprocesses and mechanisms
through which insurance or formal considerations of risk are used to influ-
ence organizational behavior in the employment law context.
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My study blends these two literatures. In particular, I import the
governing-through-risk approach into new institutional studies of law and
organizations by revealing how risk-based logics and principles that are
institutionalized by the insurance field influence what employers are told
antidiscrimination laws mean. However, I also expand the governing-
through-risk framework by exploring how institutionalized values, norms,
and logics, developed within the insurance field, are used by the insurance
industry to influence organizational strategies and decision making.
METHODOLOGY
My research design evaluates how, through EPLI, the participants in the
insurance field, that is, insurance companies, claims administrators, brokers,
agents, risk-management consultants, underwriters, product managers,
in-house counsel, and employment and insurance attorneys, construct the
meaning of compliance with antidiscrimination laws and advise employers
on how to comply with these laws. A series of subquestions guided my
inquiry: (1) How does the insurance industry frame employees’ discrimina-
tion complaints and characterize the objectives of antidiscrimination laws?;
(2) What extralegal criteria does the insurance field use to determine what
constitutes discrimination?; and (3) How do formal considerations of risk
impact the way that the insurance field evaluates what antidiscrimination
laws mean? To answer these questions, I needed to study up (Morrill 1995;
Nader 1969) and penetrate a field that is often not easily accessible to social
science research. Because unfettered access was unrealistic and preliminary
inquiries revealed industry officials were resistant to formal in-depth inter-
views, I used different sources of data from a variety of locations.3 Through
participant observation at conferences where insurance field actors come
together and interact, ethnographic interviews with insurance field actors
across the country, and content analysis of primary sources such as EPLI
webinars, EPLI insurance policies, insurance industry reports, and loss pre-
vention manuals, I explored how the meaning of antidiscrimination law gets
constituted, deployed, and contested by organizations and individuals
involved in drafting, marketing, and selling EPLI. Because I do not have data
on how EPLI impacts actual employer behavior, or whether EPLI and the
value-added services that insurers offer leads to more or less discrimination
by employers, my data focus on how the insurance field understands and
communicates what antidiscrimination law means to those that they interact
with.
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AT EPLI CONFERENCES
I attended four national conferences on EPLI over a period of two years.
EPLI conferences are three days, occur two to three times a year, and bring
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together various actors engaged in employment practices liability to discuss
important issues. These conferences have been occurring for over twenty
years. EPLI conferences are where the majority of actors involved in draft-
ing, marketing, buying, and selling EPLI engage one another. EPLI confer-
ences allowed me to observe the field and to explore how various
organizational actors think about EPLI and antidiscrimination laws, to
document what logics or frames were dominating the discourse as partici-
pants discussed EPLI, and to explore how field actors use EPLI to influence
what antidiscrimination laws mean to employers and insurance industry
officials that attend such conferences. EPLI conferences were very useful
because these conferences focused on educating and training participants on
what EPLI is and how to use it to help employers defend against various state
and federal employment law claims.
EPLI conferences were typically held at hotels. Approximately forty-five
to sixty-five insurance field actors attended these conferences. The attendees
consisted of approximately 60 percent men and 40 percent women. Panel
sessions occurred daily and brought attendees together in one conference
room.4 Conference rooms were set up much like a classroom with a podium
and table for discussants in the front of the room and rows of tables and
chairs for audience members to sit and take notes.
ETHNOGRAPHIC INTERVIEWS
My observations at the annual EPLI conferences that I attended allowed me
to identify various field actors and pursue informal, ethnographic interviews.
Ethnographic interviewing is a type of qualitative research that combines
immersive observation and directed one-on-one interviews (Spradley 1979).
Because these interviews occur in the interviewees’ natural settings while they
are performing their normal tasks, these interviews are less formal. While at
the conferences, I conducted twenty-nine ethnographic interviews with field
actors. These interviews varied in length from five to thirty minutes and
generally involved eliciting opinions about EPLI and antidiscrimination law
from (1) insurance agents, (2) brokers, (3) claims administrators, (4) insur-
ance company executives, and (5) attorneys. I asked each interviewee to offer
his or her perspective on the purpose of EPLI. Moreover, interviewees dis-
cussed the interplay between EPLI and various antidiscrimination laws.
Finally, I evaluated how, if at all, risk-based logics and principles influence
the way that field actors understand the purpose of EPLI and its relationship
to antidiscrimination laws.
WEBINARS
I observed, transcribed, and coded four EPLI webinars administered by
risk-management consultants and brokers, insurance industry EPLI experts,
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and human resource professionals or attorneys. These webinars simultane-
ously market EPLI and educate webinar participants on what EPLI is, how
EPLI is used, and highlight the various risk-management services that are
provided to employers that purchase EPLI. Similar to my evaluation of EPLI
conferences, EPLI webinars allowed me to explore how various organiza-
tional actors discuss the interplay between EPLI and antidiscrimination laws,
and to document what logics or frames were dominating the discourse as
participants discussed EPLI.
CONTENT ANALYSIS FROM PRIMARY SOURCES: LOSS PREVENTION
MANUALS AND INDUSTRY GUIDES
I analyzed insurance industry loss prevention manuals and insurance indus-
try guidelines on EPLI. Loss prevention manuals instruct insurance officials,
claims administrators, and in-house counsel on how to effectively use EPLI
insurance. Unlike loss prevention manuals, insurance industry EPLI guide-
lines are generated by independent risk-management consultants.5 Both types
of documents are drafted by a mix of employment and insurance industry
experts and attorneys specializing in insurance. Similar to EPLI conferences,
these documents continuously intersect insurance and law. EPLI guidelines
contain chapters on the history and status of employment practices liability,
the frequency and economic impact of wrongful employment practice
charges, risk management, loss prevention, insurance coverage for employ-
ment practices, underwriting and application considerations, and insurance
policy formation and analysis. Because loss prevention manuals are written
to guide in-house counsel, employers, and insurance company claims admin-
istrators, they provide detailed guidelines and recommendations concerning
how EPLI can be used to comply with antidiscrimination laws.
In terms of data collection, I purchased all three current EPLI industry
guides. I was also able to obtain three loss prevention manuals from various
insurers.6 In particular, documentary data were consistent with my findings
at conferences, webinars, and during interviews.
EVALUATION OF INDUSTRY REPORTS AND EPLI POLICIES
Because there is little empirical work by law and social science scholars that
explores EPLI, I purchased two years of industry reports and executive
summaries by risk-management consultants who conduct research on the
kinds of EPLI coverage offered by insurers. The most well-known report is
the Betterley Report (Betterley 2012), named after the risk-management
consultant who administers the survey and drafts the executive summary and
full report. These reports are given great deference by insurance field actors.
The Betterley Report was repeatedly referenced by participants in webinars,
conferences, and interviews as providing some level of authority on the
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current state of the EPLI insurance market. Thirty-six insurers that offer
EPLI responded to Betterley’s survey. The Betterley Report provides a com-
prehensive review and analysis of the differences in insurers’ EPLI coverage
and capacity. In particular, the Betterley Report provides information con-
cerning which insurers provide EPLI defense and indemnity coverage for
punitive damages, wage and hour claims, and intentional acts. In addition to
these reports, I also obtained and evaluated EPLI policies. While most EPLI
policies have similar provisions, some vary with respect to the categories
mentioned above. Information concerning insurance policy provisions pro-
vided another avenue to examine how the insurance industry uses EPLI to
influence the form of compliance with antidiscrimination laws.
CODING
I used a grounded theory approach to develop a theoretically informed expla-
nation that emerged directly from the data (Charmaz 2001). Following
standard procedures and protocols for qualitative research, data analysis
proceeded from coding, to developing conceptual categories based on the
codes, to defining the conceptual categories, and finally clarifying the links
between the conceptual categories (Lofland et al. 2005; Charmaz 2001;
Fielding 1993). In particular, I first open coded (Lofland et al. 2005). Under
this coding approach, written data from field notes and insurance industry
documents were coded line by line (Charmaz 2001). I initially created some
preliminary substantive coding categories around actors encountered in the
field, activities observed in the field, and variation in written EPLI materials
produced by insurance actors. My coding was designed to systematically
denote the actors, activities, and locales that characterize the insurance field,
and explore: (1) the ways in which the meaning of law was framed, shaped,
and communicated by insurance field actors at conferences, interviews, and
in written materials; and (2) how insurance actors advise those attending
conferences to comply with antidiscrimination laws.
Focused coding (Charmaz 2001) led me to refine my coding into analytic
categories and identify how risk-based principles and values filter the way
that insurance actors discuss compliance with antidiscrimination laws. In
order to address the traditional critique that qualitative fieldwork does not
sufficiently reveal the analytic coding process (Fielding 1993), I used quali-
tative coding software (ATLAS.ti) to code my written materials, interviews,
and field notes. While at all times I identified the codes, analyzed, and
interpreted the data, ATLAS.ti assisted with organizing my data and added
an additional layer of transparency, systematization, and formality to my
coding process.
While no one method used in this study provides enough data to reveal
conclusive findings, I am confident that triangulating across multiple sites
and examining different data points led to reliable findings about how
insurance actors and companies, through EPLI, construct the meaning of
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compliance with antidiscrimination law. There is certainly more work that
can be done in the future. For example, exploring how the strategies and legal
frames communicated during EPLI sessions are interpreted and deployed by
employers would expand this analysis. My qualitative fieldwork, therefore,
should be treated as a starting point for evaluating the microprocesses and
mechanisms through which the insurance industry generates the meaning of
public legal rights.
HOW THE INSURANCE FIELD MEDIATES THE MEANING OF
COMPLIANCE WITH ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
The following explores how insurance companies and institutions, through
EPLI, use a risk-based logic to construct the meaning of compliance with
antidiscrimination law for employers who purchase this insurance. Confer-
ences, primary sources, and interviews reveal that insurance institutions
frame the legal environment of employers as having three risk-based prob-
lems: (1) employers face uncertain legal risk in terms of unpredictable and
vague antidiscrimination laws that do not provide clear markers or guidance
on what it means to comply; (2) employers’ risk is elevated due to increased
threat of litigation and aggressive inquiries by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and plaintiffs; and (3) employers must do
whatever they can to reduce or avert these risks. By framing the legal envi-
ronment in such a manner, the insurance field creates a space to encourage
employers to purchase EPLI and use the various risk-management services
offered by insurers to help reduce these risks.
A LEGAL ENVIRONMENT WHERE EMPLOYERS FACE UNCERTAIN
LEGAL RISK
The insurance field frames employers’ legal risk, that is, the risk of loss to an
organization based on some violation of law, as uncertain, vague, and
unpredictable.7 Risk uncertainty is achieved primarily by demonstrating the
complex differences of state-by-state approaches to discrimination laws and
the evolving nature of federal employment law. The EPL Book, the leading
EPLI manual used by industry field actors, notes at its outset the extreme
variation in state employment laws: “While two states may each prohibit
discrimination on a particular basis, the extent of the protection afforded, the
process for the employee to make a claim and the possible remedies available
against the employer may vary widely” (Griffin 2001, 17). Table 1 reveals
how the insurance field frames the challenges employers face in terms of
uncertain legal risk.
Conference panels also spend considerable time emphasizing the vague
and unpredictable legal provisions of many employment laws. On a panel
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dealing with the Americans with Disabilities Act, insurance industry profes-
sionals and lawyers highlighted the uncertain legal risk that employers face:
“It is hard for employers, hard for insurance companies, hard for everyone to
know what essential functions are, what constitutes a major life activity,
undue hardship, or the interactive process” (EPL Conference, Panel 32, lines
200–4).8 When discussing the importance of having an effective reporting
process for employee complaints, panelists acknowledged that the law is
unclear concerning what constitutes a complaint and when a complaint has
been made: If an employee says my supervisor is difficult, is that a complaint?
My supervisor is abusive. Is that a complaint? I need to express my breast
milk. Is that a complaint? My health insurance plan does not cover every-
thing it should. Is that a complaint? We have little guidance on when a
complaint actually occurs (EPL Conference, Panel 33, lines 345–53.)
Although some insurance industry panelists explain how they understand
particular legal provisions, panelists often emphasize uncertain legal risk.
A LEGAL ENVIRONMENT WHERE EMPLOYERS FACE AN ELEVATED RISK
OF LAWSUITS
In addition to focusing on how employers face uncertain, vague, and unpre-
dictable laws, insurance field actors tell employers that they face an elevated
and heightened risk of being sued (cf. Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman,
Abraham, and Erlanger 1992). Table 2 highlights how field actors routinely
discuss the growth, burden, and cost of employment lawsuits in documentary
data and webinars.
Table 1. Examples of the Insurance Industry Framing Uncertain Legal Risk
“The only consistent and reliable aspect of personnel laws and regulations is that they are in
a constant state of flux. Federal and state legislatures frequently enact new legislation and
amend existing statutes. Courts continuously reinterpret the meaning of established labor
laws.” (Griffin 2001, 88, 91)
“Even human resource professionals can be frustrated when they attempt to make sense of
labor laws that contradict each other.” (Griffin 2001, 91)
“Even though a narrow definition of discrimination may be acceptable to some insureds, an
uninsured exposure might exist when new laws are passed or new protected classes are
created.” (Griffin 2001, 270)
“Today, relations between employer and employee are governed by a complex and constantly
changing body of laws and regulations. . .The complexity of laws, courts, and agencies
enhances the importance of EPLI for employers.” (Professional Liability Underwriting
Society 2012, 2–5)
“Sexual harassment exists when a reasonable individual of complainant’s sex and sexual
orientation would be offended by the conduct or language complained of. Such a standard
may clearly be open to substantial debate and second guessing if the requested date results
in subsequent litigation. . .There is not always a bright line between a relationship that is
consensual and one that isn’t.” (Griffin 2001, 23)
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Insurance industry executives at conferences refer to plaintiffs as “frus-
trated” and “desperate” and the EEOC as “scary” and “aggressive.” To
support these claims, panelists often show videos from the EEOC website of
EEOC employees encouraging claimants to bring forward claims. The insur-
ance field also emphasizes increasing perils facing employers:
As of May 1, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had a
backlog of over 100,000 discrimination complaints and the average complaint
took more than a year to handle. In 2009, over 12,000 complaints of sexual
harassment were filed. Settlements for cases exceeded $50 million, and the
defense and lawyer costs were several times this number . . . In the current
economic climate, not only are EPLI claims increasing, but so is the potential
financial risk to your company if you are not covered with quality EPLI
insurance. The potential cost of a discrimination claim can threaten the future
viability of your business. Most importantly, employee-related claims are on
the rise, and these EPLI claims include a number of different issues. (EPLI, Our
Shared Liability Solution)10
Finally, insurance actors frame litigation risk as inevitable:
From what I can gather, if you’ve got 100 employees, you can expect to get sued
once every three years . . . There are two types of organizations out there: those
Table 2. Examples of the Insurance Industry Framing Employer Risk of
Lawsuits as Elevated
“Every organization with employees is at risk for employment-related lawsuits. Some
estimates indicate that 50% of companies with over 50 employees do not have EPLI, and
that three out of five businesses will have an EPLI lawsuit within the next five years.”
(Professional Liability Underwriting Society, 1–6)
“Not-for-profit corporations and public entities, in addition to public and private businesses,
are experiencing an explosion of employment-related claims.” (Griffin 2001, 1)
“The Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases signal an increased likelihood that an
organization may be held vicariously liable for sexual harassment committed by supervisors
and managers.” (Griffin 2001, 7)
“I wouldn’t let my daughter run a lemonade stand without EPLI.” (EPL Conference, Panel 4,
lines 543–46)
“In light of today’s increasingly litigious environment, it is not unusual to find a variety of
common-law tort, quasi contract, or other state law claims attached to a complaint alleging
discrimination, sexual harassment, or wrongful discharge.” (Griffin 2001, 35)
“The news today is filled with charges, counter charges, and huge awards arising from
employment practices issues. In fact, employees are probably one of the greatest liability
challenges in business today. Whether the charges involve discrimination due to race, sex,
or age, wrongful termination, or sexual harassment, the results can be financially
devastating. A worker in Iowa was awarded $85 million, another in Milwaukee, $26.6
million.” (CPA)9
“In addition, the cost to successfully defend employment disputes can be enormous.
Even so-called nuisance suits can cost 25,000 dollars or more just to defend, and very
large verdicts and settlements in excess of 100 million are not unheard of.” (Griffin
2001, 64)
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who have been sued and those who are going to be sued. We don’t know when,
we don’t know for how much and it’s only luck of the draw how bad it’s going
to be. I’ve seen many plaintiffs who should have settled for $25,000 but it was
war. They were never going to be happy. (Webinar, January 23, 2013, HR That
Works, lines 1011–22)
In sum, insurance field actors at conferences and in written documents
elevate or heighten the risk of litigation, frame plaintiffs and the EEOC as
aggressive, and discuss the increased costs of defending and settling employ-
ment disputes.
A LEGAL ENVIRONMENT WHERE EMPLOYERS SHOULD REDUCE AND
AVERT RISK
Once the insurance field frames the legal risks facing employers as uncertain
but elevated and likely to occur, the insurance field encourages employers
and risk-management consultants to avert or reduce this risk by purchasing
EPLI insurance and the accompanying risk-management services. Panels and
webinars follow almost a uniform formula: discuss the vague, complex, and
uncertain legal risks facing employers; discuss the growth, costs, and inevi-
tability of lawsuits; and then discuss how to reduce employment practice
liability exposure by purchasing EPLI. Table 3 illustrates how the insurance
field encourages employers to reduce risk by using EPLI’s risk-management
services.
Whereas prior research demonstrates how employment management pro-
fessionals are influenced by their training and location in the organization
and covet discretion and other managerial values (Marshall 2005; Edelman,
Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001; Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993), insur-
ance actors frame the legal environment in terms of risk reduction: “Employ-
ers and shareholders need cost certainty. You should insure as much as
possible. EPLI is a product that protects and controls risk” (EPL Confer-
ence, Panel 4, 442–69). The institutionalized emphasis on risk reduction is
demonstrated by panel topics chosen for EPLI conferences. Table 4 high-
lights how the panel titles for an EPLI conference held in 2013 expressly
make risk aversion and reduction an explicit component of virtually all the
panels.
In sum, unlike prior studies that explore how employment management
professionals emphasize diversity, flexibility, and managerial rhetoric
(Marshall 2005; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001; Edelman, Erlanger,
and Lande 1993), the insurance field emphasizes that employers face a legal
environment filled with uncertain legal risk, an elevated risk of litigation, and
a need to reduce risk. By framing employers’ legal environment in terms of
risk, the insurance field creates a space to encourage employers to engage in
managerialized responses and develop formalized procedures by using the
various risk-management services offered by insurers to help mitigate these
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risks. Similar to prior new institutional studies (Edelman, Fuller, and
Mara-Drita 2001), these logics are institutionalized within the insurance field
through professional networking, conferences, and training materials.
The following section highlights how the insurance industry uses EPLI
and the accompanying risk-management services that it offers employers to
build discretion into legal rules and recontextualize legal rules around a
nonlegal risk logic anchored in shifting risk and responsibility off of
employers and on to insurance companies that offer EPLI. As this process
occurs, the insurance field mediates the meaning of compliance with anti-
discrimination laws for employers in ways that at times may be compatible
with civil rights goals of improving equality, due process, and fair gover-
nance in workplace settings, but at other times may simply make discrimi-
nation claims against employers more defensible (cf. Bisom-Rapp 1996,
1999). For a processual explanation of how the insurance field uses a risk-
based logic to construct the meaning of compliance with antidiscrimination
laws, see Figure 1.
Table 3. Examples of Insurance Industry Calling for Employers to
Reduce and Avert Risk
“But because the frequency and severity of EPL claims is rising, the importance of a
coordinated risk management approach, including the consideration of specialized EPL
insurance, should not be overlooked.” (Griffin 2001, 70)
“Growing perils involving employment, disgruntled shareholders, mergers/acquisitions,
government investigations, ERISA violations and employee dishonesty require more
innovation and more flexibility among insurance programs and providers. At the same
time, businesses want less complication. They want to make easier choices, and feel secure
about their course of action. E-Risk Services has developed comprehensive insurance
solutions and products that offer the versatility, simplicity and security today’s businesses
are seeking.” (E-Risk Services)11
“Every employer needs clear policies and procedures to protect against liability and define the
rights of employees and employers. Instantly create a professional and customized
employee handbook that is tailored specifically to your organization’s size and state. Save
thousands of dollars and weeks of work. Don’t wait for a lawsuit to start thinking about
harassment prevention. Take advantage of this online training that covers 18 different
topics including sexual harassment to properly identify and handle issues. This training
may help you satisfy various state mandated training requirements. But, we offer it to
employers nationwide as a valuable risk reduction tool. There is not enough time to read
wordy newsletters. The monthly updates get right to the point with a simple hyperlink to
the question and case of the month, [and] federal and state news updates.” (E-Risk EPL
Helpline, lines 32–41 (emphasis added)12
“In response to the escalation in EPLI litigation and the financial risk to small businesses for
EPLI claims, [our organization] offers our partner companies’ expertise and experience in
relation to Employment Practices Liability and finding the best in EPLI third-party
coverage. By pooling our power, [we are] able to negotiate an EPLI program that makes
sense for your company. The shared liability solution can and will work for you.” (EPLI,
Our Shared Liability Solution)13
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INSURANCE COMPANIES USE POLICY LANGUAGE TO BUILD DISCRETION
INTO LEGAL RULES
EPLI insurers mediate what antidiscrimination laws mean through insurance
policy language. In particular, insurance companies draft EPLI policies in
ways that build discretion into formal legal rules. In other words, even
though the law on the books forbids insurance coverage for certain acts or
omissions in civil rights contexts, insurance companies develop work-
arounds that provide coverage. In doing so, the potential impact of civil
rights remedies is diluted.
The evolution of insurance coverage of punitive damages is illustrative.
Traditionally, insurers did not provide coverage for punitive damages. Insur-
ance companies exclude coverage for willful or wanton acts because insurers
do not want to incentivize poor behavior by insureds. Moreover, insurance
coverage for either punitive damages or intentional acts committed by an
insured is prohibited by statutes, regulations, or court cases in approximately
twenty-five states (Betterley 2012). Courts often hold that insurance coverage
for punitive damages is contrary to public policy. Thus, the law on the books
in many states prevents employers from shifting risk and responsibility to
insurance companies when facing punitive damages. However, through
EPLI, the insurance field mediates this potential risk that employers face by
providing work-arounds that allow employers coverage even in states that
prohibit the insurability of punitive damage awards. Conferences, interviews,
Table 4. EPLI Conference Panel Titles
The Evolution of EPLI Policies: Views from the Brokers, Carriers and In-House Labor and
Employment Counsel on Claims Trends, Minimizing Claims, Controlling Costs and the
Current Pulse of the EPLI Marketplace.
Adapting to Expanded Regulatory and Enforcement Efforts Relating to Employment Practices:
How Companies Should Prepare for and Respond to Supervision in a Multi-Agency
Environment
2013’s Pivotal Supreme Court Decisions and Legislation Affecting the EPLI Realm
The Impact of Social Media in the Workplace: Benchmarking Best Practices and Policies in
Today’s Cyber-Culture
Current Trends in Workplace Harassment and Discrimination: Transgender, Racial, Age and
Gender Claims
Retaliation and Whistleblowing: How Employers Can Prevent This Increasingly Prevalent
Threat, and Responding to the Latest Claims
Wage and Hour and EPLI: Assessing How the Market has Responded to Coverage Needs and
Best Practices for Mitigating Exposure to Claims
Risk Management and Avoidance: Everything Insureds, Counsel, and Insurers Now Need to
Know, With a Deep Dive into Early Case Assessment and Resolution
The Triangular Relationship of Carriers, Insureds, and Defense Counsel: Ensuring Ethical
Conduct in in the Management, Litigation, and Settlement of EPL Claims
Note: Emphasis added.
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and documentary data reveal that the vast majority of EPLI insurers now
offer coverage for punitive damages in amounts up to the full limit of
liability.
One way that insurers build discretion into legal rules is by including
most-favorable venue language in the EPLI policy. A most-favored venue
endorsement is a choice of law provision that applies the law of some other
state to determine the insurability of punitive damages. My review of various
EPLI policies reveals that most-favored venue language takes a few different
forms. Under one approach, the policy expressly states that the enforceability
of coverage shall be governed by the applicable law that most favors coverage
for punitive and exemplary damages. A slightly narrower approach involves
insurance companies listing state jurisdictions in their policies that the insur-
ance companies must look toward in determining insurability. If any of the
listed states permit punitive damages to be insured, then the insurer must
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Figure 1. How the Insurance Industry Uses Risk to Construct the Meaning of
Compliance with Antidiscrimination Laws.
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the mechanisms through which the insurance field
attempts to influence compliance with antidiscrimination laws. The insurance field
first constructs the legal environment that employers encounter as uncertain and
facing an increased chance of litigation, and therefore, there is a need for risk
reduction. By framing employers’ legal environment in this manner, it allows the
insurance field to offer employers EPLI and a series of risk-management services
that construct what compliance with law means. Risk-based logics are used to
encourage employers to engage in managerial responses and develop formalized
procedures.
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treat that jurisdiction as the applicable one for purposes of assessing its
ability to pay punitive damages. Thus, even though the law on the books
often prohibits coverage for punitive damages, the law in action is that these
damages are covered by EPLI.
Insurance institutions use conferences, webinars, and loss prevention
manuals to advertise, endorse, and ultimately institutionalize a work-around
of laws that prohibit coverage for punitive damages. The following highlights
how the insurance field, through the trainer administering the webinar, builds
discretion and flexibility into legal rules and navigates around laws that
prohibit insurance coverage for punitive damages:
Most of the insurance policies provide coverage for punitive damages, but
there’s a huge caveat. And the caveat would be [whether] the coverage is
allowed by law, and there are a number of states that don’t allow the insurance
of punitive damages. So there’s a tweak to the policy, generally referred to as
most-favorable venue, which you’ll find in many of the EPL policies that
essentially provides some flexibility in whether the insured can actually collect
a punitive damages insurance claim. (Webinar, January 23, 2013, HR That
Works, lines 710–30)
In addition, many insurers have offshore facilities or enter into relation-
ships with foreign insurance companies to provide wrap-around policies that
will ultimately pay employers’ punitive damages liability. These insurance
policies are underwritten and sold completely offshore, often in Bermuda or
London, to employers with offices within the United States. These non-US
jurisdictions have a more liberal rule concerning insuring policyholders from
the United States against punitive damages. Because these wrap-around
policies are sold offshore, they are not subject to state law prohibitions on
coverage for punitive damages. According to an insurance risk-management
expert trainer:
A more guaranteed, but more cumbersome and expensive version of [most-
favored venue] is a separate policy written in a lovely place like Bermuda, where
the type of coverage available is not governed by US law or regulation. And
that policy would be, essentially a parallel policy, and it is typically only bought
by relatively large companies. (Webinar, January 23, 2013, HR That Works,
lines 715–39)
Bermuda wrap-around policies apply not just to judgments that include
punitive damage awards, but settlements as well. Risk-management insur-
ance specialists indicate that there is no restriction on an insurer’s ability to
pay a settlement of a punitive damage claim as opposed to a final and
nonappealable punitive damage judgment.
Thus, in this instance, even though civil rights laws often potentially
subject employers to punitive damages, and state insurance laws often pro-
hibit the insurability of such damages, EPLI insurers build discretion into
their policies and broaden coverage to include punitive damages. Framed as
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necessary risk management and risk aversion, EPLI weakens the ability of
state and federal civil rights laws to hold employers directly responsible for
paying such damages as employers now have the ability to transfer these risks
to insurers.14
INSURANCE COMPANIES RECONTEXTUALIZE LEGAL RULES AROUND
A NONLEGAL RISK LOGIC
Insurance companies do not just build discretion into legal rules, they
recontextualize legal rules around a nonlegal risk logic that focuses on avert-
ing risk and making discrimination claims against employers more
defensible. One example of how the insurance field transforms the meaning of
employment law is through its recommendations concerning when to use
performance improvement plans (PIPs). PIPs are a progressive discipline
policy that was created in the past forty-five years as a mechanism for
improving employee performance and communicating an employer’s expec-
tations to the employee. In particular, PIPs advise an employee that her
performance is inadequate, ascertain reasons for why her performance is
inadequate, identify what is unacceptable in the employee’s performance,
specify precisely what the employee is expected to do in the future, and
provide a clear warning that a failure to correct performance deficiencies will
result in adverse consequences. PIPs help the employee by setting goals while
also providing notice that if such goals are not achieved, there could be
adverse consequences. In addition to the potential adverse consequences, the
results of the performance appraisals may be used as a basis for rewarding,
reassigning, and promoting employees. Employers market and celebrate the
usefulness of PIPs and other legalized policies and procedures in their train-
ing manuals (Sutton et al. 1994). Moreover, federal agencies are required to
provide a PIP when the employee’s performance is deemed unacceptable (5
CFR § 432.104).15
While employers’ institutionalized practice is to provide PIPs prior to
terminating employees, the insurance field discourages using PIPs against
employees that might be terminated. Panelists at EPLI conferences routinely
discourage using PIPs, especially if an employee has previously made a
complaint to an employer. One panelist indicated: “PIPs are bad for litiga-
tion; 80 percent of people who receive a PIP end up being fired. Jurors view
PIPs as a way to set someone up to be fired, especially if the employee raised
a complaint or concern earlier” (EPL Conference, Panel 2, lines 215–17). In
addition to panelists, loss prevention guidelines suggest that issuing PIPs to
an employee that has previously raised a complaint increases litigation risk.
Thus, the value of using PIPs as an effective mechanism for improving
employee performance is now recontextualized by insurance field actors
around managing and averting risk and avoiding a negative inference from a
jury at trial. To the extent the insurers’ advice is followed, employers and
employees may be stripped of a useful and protective tool.
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Insurance companies and risk-management specialists at conferences focus
considerable time on making discrimination claims against employers
more defensible. For example, under traditional agency law principles, an
employer can be held vicariously liable under Title VII if one of its supervi-
sors engages in discriminatory behavior. Legal decisions and legislation
holding employers liable for the actions of supervisors encourages and pro-
motes increased training and monitoring of supervisors. Employers, in turn,
spend time developing policies and procedures and educating their supervi-
sors on what constitutes permissible conduct. In Vance v Ball State University
(2013), however, the US Supreme Court narrowed the scope of who consti-
tutes a supervisor in sexual harassment cases. The Court in Vance held that
a supervisor is not simply an individual who directs the daily activities of
other employees but instead is one who has the ability to take “tangible
employment actions against the victim” such as hiring, firing, disciplining,
promoting, or reassigning an employee.
Employment practice liability training sessions celebrate the Vance decision
as a “victory for employers” because it provides employers an easier and
clearer standard to apply when determining an employee’s supervisory status
in sexual harassment cases (EPL Conference, Panel 1, lines 100–8). How are
employers advised by insurance companies to respond in light of the Vance
decision? Insurance institutions recontextualize the Vance decision in terms of
risk shifting and avoiding liability. EPLI risk-management consultants and
attorneys suggest that employers not have many supervisors, selectively use
the term supervisor, clearly document and communicate levels of authority,
and avoid behavior that gives an inference that the employee is a supervisor. In
particular, field actors dissuade employers from having lots of employees
participate in training programs that could suggest an employee is a supervi-
sor. Finally, employers that follow these suggestions are encouraged to bring
more motions for summary judgment since the law has narrowed the definition
of supervisor. In this instance, insurance institutions are steering employers
toward avoiding liability and defending cases, encouraging narrower
employee job descriptions, and advocating for less comprehensive training to
employees who are engaged in possible supervisory capacities. Unlike in the
directors and officers insurance liability context where insurers fail to engage
in loss prevention behavior (Baker and Griffith 2010), insurance institutions
involved with EPLI do engage in loss prevention advice. However, within the
context of risk reduction, EPLI insurers engage in loss prevention in a way that
focuses largely on limiting exposure of the employer and potentially weaken-
ing the impact of state and federal civil rights laws on workplace environments.
In addition to trying to make claims more defensible, insurance field actors
also address the most recent changes in antidiscrimination laws and advise
employers how to alleviate risk. For example, conferences and training ses-
sions spend considerable time discussing workplace bullying, a relatively new
workplace issue that is now being increasingly litigated by plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Workplace bullying occurs when an employee is subjected to abusive conduct
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that is so severe that it causes physical or psychological harm. Examples of
abusive conduct that constitute workplace bullying include repeated inflic-
tion of verbal abuse, intimidating or humiliating conduct against the
employee, or gratuitous sabotage or undermining of an employee’s work
performance. Although approximately twenty-five states have filed legisla-
tion pushing for healthy workplace laws, workplace bullying is currently not
illegal unless carried out against someone in a protected class. EPLI confer-
ence panelists, however, indicate that alleged victims of bullying use a variety
of existing legal causes of action to pursue these claims, including defama-
tion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and super-
vision, and assault and battery. The proposed healthy workplace laws,
existing causes of action, and the raised awareness of workplace bullying in
public discourse encourage employers to increasingly foster a safe and posi-
tive work environment.
Although insurance institutions have an opportunity to encourage more
lawful conduct in light of changing antidiscrimination laws, insurance field
actors shift responsibility for fostering a safe and positive workplace away
from employers by communicating how EPLI provides coverage for employ-
ers in the event that an employee is found liable for bullying: “Don’t worry.
EPLI has a catch all for these situations. Bullying claims fall within the
definition of wrongful act in the policy—it is a wrongful workplace policy or
procedure” (EPL Conference, Panel 11, lines 360–63). Thus, similar to the
directors and officers liability insurance context (Baker and Griffith 2010),
insurers have the ability to engage in loss prevention behavior but do not
undertake such action. As opposed to highlighting ways to prevent work-
place bullying, insurers at conferences and webinars focus on risk aversion
and subtly shift risk and responsibility away from employers by emphasizing
that EPLI provides insurance defense and indemnification for this particular
legal claim.16
RISK-MANAGEMENT VALUE-ADDED SERVICES: MECHANISMS THROUGH
WHICH INSURERS SEEK TO INFLUENCE THE FORM OF COMPLIANCE
In contrast to the treatment of punitive damages and how to respond to
contemporary Supreme Court cases, EPLI insurers also provide risk-
management or value-added services to employers that purchase EPLI that
may be compatible with or even induce more compliance. While these ser-
vices vary, the goal is to help employers become more knowledgeable and
proactive about their employment practice risks and to reduce the number of
claims and the amount of losses that occur. Insurers, risk-management con-
sultants, and brokers market these services as reducing costs and risks while
also helping foster a positive culture:
This is a unique program. It is designed to build companies, and to make a
difference in your bottom line. We have the compliance materials just like
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everyone else. But, we also have the culture building and growth building
materials. (HR That Works About Us Info Video)17
The result of using this program is protections from disloyal employees, greedy
lawyers, power hungry bureaucrats, and unfortunately your own costly
mistakes. The upside is that you’re able to hire, keep, and motivate great
employees, have career improvement, a healthier bottom line, and the peace of
mind that comes with knowing you’ve got your act together. (HR That Works
Demo)18
These value-added and loss prevention services allow insurers to not just shift
risk off employers, but provide an opportunity for insurers to encourage
managerialized responses and a formalization of policies and procedures in
workplace settings. Whereas prior new institutional research highlights how
managerial values influence the way that organizations understand law and
compliance (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001), risk and managerial
values work hand in hand in the context of drafting, marketing, and selling
EPLI.
LEGAL HOTLINES
One way that insurance institutions influence the form of civil rights compli-
ance is through the EPLI hotline that employers may access when they want
answers to legal questions. These toll-free hotlines put employers in direct
contact with attorneys and law firms that EPLI insurers have contracted with
to provide legal consulting and advice. Thus, these lawyers act as surrogates
for the insurance company. Employers may make an unlimited number of
calls to the hotline and all calls are confidential. Employers using these
hotlines ask questions concerning how employment law affects a potential
employment-related action, the development of a policy or procedure, or
advice on a strategic personnel decision. Questions that arise are almost
exclusively legal in nature and handled by a small group of specialty employ-
ment law firms. Table 5 highlights how insurers routinely advertise the kinds
of legal questions their hotline answers for employers.
Table 5. Employer Inquiries to Insurer-Controlled Legal Hotlines
“We plan to cut several employees’ hours, but plan to maintain their full-time status. Is there
any law that prohibits us from doing so?” (E-Risk Services)19
“What is the Tennessee statute on lunch breaks? Does the statute have a number?” (Ibid.)
“Does an employee have a right to privacy in email messages that he sends or receives at
work? Can we look at those messages?” (Insurance Co. Loss Prevention Materials)20
“A minority employee maintains that she was overlooked for a promotion because of her
ethnicity and her religion. What action should I consider?” (Ibid.)
“Are we required to offer training about sexual harassment?” (Ibid.)
“Is it necessary to offer FMLA to an employee who is off work because of a workers’
compensation injury?” (E-Risk Services)21
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As these examples illustrate, when employers call these hotlines, they gain
answers to legal questions from lawyers that EPLI insurers select and pay.
EPLI hotlines reduce risk by providing information on how employers can
better comply with laws.
Industry experts consider the hotline the most useful value-added service
that they offer employers: “The one that’s seen as most valuable is the
opportunity to call a lawyer for free” (Webinar, January 23, 2013, HR That
Works, lines 900–4). Risk-management consultants and attorneys who
answer hotline questions repeatedly frame themselves as legal coaches whose
job is to try to guide employers toward minimizing liability and risk: “The
best services are the ones where there’s a personal contact where you’re
actually able to not just assess information, but they actually coach you
through a problem” (Ibid., lines 911–18). Thus, to the extent that the law
firms that are sponsored by insurance companies provide accurate advice
concerning employment matters to employers, the hotlines provide a
pathway for insurance companies to influence how employers understand
their legal obligations. In this respect, EPLI value-added services can poten-
tially increase compliance.
WRITTEN TRAINING MATERIALS
In addition to assistance provided by telephone, insurers attempt to construct
what compliance with antidiscrimination laws mean through a series of
written value-added services. These documents also advise employers on how
to prevent and defend employment lawsuits. EPLI insurers offer employers
over 200 personnel forms, policies, and checklists, along with monthly news-
letters, compliance quizzes, videos, and legal summaries and updates, includ-
ing some that address hiring, employee retention, compliance, performance
management, and termination decisions. Similar to training conducted by
employers (Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999), EPLI loss prevention manuals and
training sessions specifically coach employers on how to make discrimination
claims more defensible: “this guide is intended to help . . . It includes prac-
tical suggestions for limiting employment liability, from initial interview to
termination of employment, and it discusses common types of employment
claims and what to expect from employment litigation” (Ins. Co., Loss
Prevention Guidelines, 89–91).22 Building a written file against employees
and documenting complaints and problems with employees is reiterated
repeatedly at conferences and in written materials that are provided to
employers. EPLI insurers also often audit an employer’s written policies,
procedures, forms, and handbooks to determine whether they comply with
federal, state, and local laws. Similar to the hotlines and written materials
that are provided to employers, EPLI audits focus on interpreting and imple-
menting employment laws and preventing employment lawsuits.
Insurers offer employers access to the employee handbook and employ-
ment “contract builder.” This service allows employers to simply click and
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drag from an online portal whichever provisions they want included in their
employee handbook and employment contract. Employers are able to build
a handbook and develop contracts without actually drafting the documents:
[We use a] very robust Microsoft Share Point platform and we have pre-
populated that platform with all the strategies and tools that you can see on this
front page here that allow you to create other tools like audits, quizzes, and
surveys . . . You’re able to customize your page to a certain degree. Your
company logo will go in there and you’re able to add some links very easily
from the external link button. (HR That Works About Us Info Video)23
These written value-added services can have a potential positive and nega-
tive impact on compliance. On the one hand, offering these services may
reflect some best practices, lead to improved employment handbooks and
contracts, and may promote a better work culture. On the other hand, these
services make it easy for employers to develop policies and procedures
without actively drafting them. Also, insurance company guidance on these
issues largely focuses on how to avoid litigation as opposed to providing steps
to build a discrimination-free work environment—the often stated goal of
risk-management services offered by EPLI insurers.
Thus, with respect to the insurance field’s risk-management services, we see
how risk and managerial logics complement one another (cf. Edelman,
Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001). The insurance field has itself adopted a
managerialized conception of employment law, which highlights the elabo-
ration of employers’ formal structures that demonstrate compliance and
rational governance. The insurance industry sells this vision by highlighting
the risk of not developing policies and procedures, as well as providing a
safety net for employers in the form of defense and indemnification insurance
coverage.
EPLI risk-management services influence the form of compliance by
recontextualizing antidiscrimination laws around a nonlegal risk logic that
focuses on avoiding litigation. In doing so, my study reveals that insurance
institutions do not just influence private law as prior research on insurance
suggests, but rather shape the meaning of public legal rights and remedies
afforded employees by federal and state laws in subtle but important ways.
THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study elaborates the literature on the relationship between organizations
and law by combining new institutional organizational sociology studies of
how organizations respond to legal regulation and sociolegal insurance schol-
ars’ studies of how institutions govern through risk. In particular, my study
bridges these two theoretical frameworks by revealing how insurance institu-
tions rely on risk-based principles and narratives to construct the threat of
employment law and influence the form of compliance from employers.
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Although prior new institutional studies of law and organizations empha-
size the way that managerial values influence what antidiscrimination law
means, governing through risk provides an alternative framework by
showing how risk values are mobilized by the insurance field when evaluating
and interpreting what compliance with antidiscrimination laws mean.
Through EPLI and a series of accompanying risk-management tools, insur-
ance institutions conceptualize antidiscrimination law in terms of risk and
encourage employers to engage in managerialized responses. My study
reveals how risk and managerial narratives in this setting are complementary.
Finally, my study enhances prior new institutional research by highlighting
the role that insurance and, in particular, insurance institutions play in
shaping the nature of civil rights compliance.
While insurance scholars’ research on governing through risk informs new
institutionalists, the new institutional framework also enhances sociolegal
studies of insurance. New institutional understandings of how organizational
fields have norms, values, and logics that become institutionalized within a
field and alter the meaning of law and compliance inform the governing-
through-risk studies because they help explain how risk-based principles
influence the way that the insurance field constructs the nature of civil rights
compliance. Uncertain legal risk, risk elevation, and a call for risk reduction
through purchasing EPLI insurance all create and perpetuate a legal envi-
ronment that calls for risk management. My multisite, multimethod
approach shows how risk narratives are institutionalized in the insurance
field through not just policy language, but a series of value-added services
that insurers offer. My study enhances prior empirical studies of governing
through risk by revealing how the insurance field governs through risk and
uses considerations of risk and insurance services to influence organizational
strategy and decision making. Prior work in the directors and officers context
shows how the insurance industry has the ability to engage in loss prevention
behavior but does not try to engage in such behavior (Baker and Griffith
2010). In this instance, the insurance industry does try to engage in loss
prevention but does so in a manner that at times is consistent with the civil
rights logic of fostering equality, due process, and fair governance, but at
other times seems focused largely on making discrimination claims simply
more defensible.
From a policy standpoint, this study raises important questions about the
role of insurance in regulating employer and employee relationships. While
prior research highlights how insurance acts as a form of social control on
society (Abraham 2013; Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012; Baker and Griffith
2010; Baker and Simon 2002), important questions remain: Should insurers
regulate employer behavior? If so, how should that authority be exercised?
Similar to human resource officials, in-house counsel, and managers
(Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001; Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande
1993), my data suggest that the insurance field’s involvement as an interme-
diary may be mixed.
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It is important to note that insurers’ eagerness to offer EPLI and the
accompanying risk-management services is not driven by a desire to weaken
antidiscrimination law or a lack of concern for employee discrimination and
harassment. Insurers believe their policies and their risk-management ser-
vices build a healthy work culture, shift risk away from employers, and
prevent lawsuits. EPLI and risk-management services, such as the audits,
hotlines, and online portals of employment handbook materials, provide
substantive guidance on the law and educate employers on their
responsibilities. To the extent that the information provided to employers is
accurate in these settings, these services could be compatible with compliance
and even induce greater compliance.
However, my fieldwork also suggests at times that there is a disconnect
between the moral tones in which legislators, judges, and lawyers discuss
antidiscrimination law and the risk tones that insurers use that suggest that
litigation is inevitable and needs to be managed (rather than a sign of morally
wrongful conduct that must be eradicated). Thus, while EPLI may improve
compliance, it may potentially undermine formal legal rights in several ways.
First, the punitive and deterrence goals of antidiscrimination laws may
remain unfulfilled when employers purchase EPLI. When insurers sell insur-
ance that covers employment discrimination claims and punitive damages, it
allows employers to shift risk and responsibility away from themselves. Even
though civil rights laws are supposed to increase law abiding behavior, EPLI
insurers may dilute Title VII’s deterrence capabilities and insulate employers
from liability. For example, using punitive damages as a legal weapon that
punishes employers for gross misconduct may be weakened if EPLI insurers
are able to provide insurance coverage to employers that are found liable for
punitive damages. Risk-management programs that advise employers in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance to narrow the scope of supervisors
to avoid liability, as opposed to counseling employers on permissible and
impermissible modes of supervision, may not further the goals of civil rights.
Thus, insurer risk-management tools may deflect attention from societal and
historical practices that disenfranchised particular groups and instead shift
focus toward avoiding lawsuits.
Second, over-reliance on EPLI risk-management systems may allow
employers to avoid more active engagement with the design, content, enforce-
ment, and maintenance of its employment policies. By encouraging employers
to use insurer-sponsored legal hotlines and contract builder and employment
handbook online portals, the insurance field shifts or decouples responsibility
for hard normative judgments to others (such as insurance companies) oper-
ating outside the organization (cf. Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001;
Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999). Insurance industry services that diminish an
employer’s individual responsibility to design its employment policies and
procedures may diminish employer responsibility for making moral, ethical,
and legal choices involved with compliance (cf. Baker 2002). To the extent
employers can simply download employment contract and handbook
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documents from insurers offering such risk-management services, EPLI
enhances the possibility that employers may be lethargic in taking ownership
over compliance policies and procedures and, consequently, prevent employ-
ment laws from positively impacting workplace environments.
Finally, EPLI risk-management services do not just reduce risk; they
actively construct the meaning of compliance and law. Given that much of
employment law is ambiguous, insurance companies are filling in the space
and interpreting the meaning of compliance (Edelman 1990, 1992). The
insurance field acts as a legal intermediary between what civil rights laws say
in cases and statutes and how civil rights are implemented and enforced by
employers (cf. Talesh 2015). While not many people dispute that the civil
rights revolution produced significant results, there is sharp disagreement
over the extent to which some employees continue to encounter discrimina-
tion and what, if anything, the law can do about it. Laws protecting against
discrimination honor the ideal of public justice and nudge organizations
toward fidelity to law when dealing with employee complaints. It is entirely
natural for employers subject to civil rights laws to seek to demonstrate their
compliance and for insurance companies to offer services that spread, shift,
and reduce that risk. However, as a policy matter, it is crucial that legislators,
regulators, and the citizenry interrogate those forms of compliance and, in
particular, intermediaries, such as insurance companies, that attempt to
influence the nature of civil rights compliance. Otherwise, these risk-
management services may merely encourage employers to reduce their expo-
sure and liability rather than prevent discrimination, improve work culture,
and cultivate a discrimination-free work environment.
At a minimum, this article highlights the potential for constructive link-
ages between studies on risk management, managerial rhetoric, and law and
organizations. More qualitative, empirical studies of how risk-based logics
are mobilized by intermediaries and mediate what law means would help
strengthen organizational theory. Clearly, future scholarship should address
the relationship between risk-based logics, constructions of law, and organi-
zational practices. Only empirical studies of employers’ actual practices
implementing policies and procedures can reveal whether EPLI and the
accompanying risk-management services lead employers toward greater
compliance, or whether employers are simply making discrimination claims
more legally defensible. Given the likely variation in the extent to which
organizational risk management and compliance programs embrace or
neglect civil rights laws, future studies should seek to disentangle this puzzle
and further elucidate what workplace equality means in action.
NOTES
1. The insuring agreement in a typical EPLI policy provides that the insurance
company will pay on behalf of the insured for damages in excess of the deductible
234 LAW & POLICY July 2015
© 2015 The Author
Law & Policy © 2015 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585715
arising out of any employment practices to which the insurance applies. In a
typical EPLI policy, damages means monetary amounts, but does not include
fines, injunctive relief, punitive damages, or judgments awarded due to acts
uninsurable by law. However, as this article shows, the definition of damages has
been expanded over time.
2. Although there are a few new institutional studies in this area that mention
litigation threat or risk, new institutionalists have yet to engage in a comprehen-
sive exploration of the processes through which risk narratives influence the
meaning of compliance (Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger
1992).
3. Both in writing and in person, I requested formal, recorded, in-depth interviews
with forty-three insurance field actors. The vast majority declined, though many
were willing to speak more informally. Thus, ethnographic interviews proved to
be a more effective interviewing approach (Spradley 1979).
4. There was never more than one panel session going on at a time.
5. Risk-management consultants are experts who can be hired on a project or
retainer basis to help solve specific risk-management issues and problems for
companies. These consultants do not sell insurance and are not affiliated with
entities that sell insurance. Rather, these intermediaries provide expertise and
advice on insurance policy design and coverage, self-insurance, claims manage-
ment, and loss prevention.
6. Insurance companies typically do not publish their loss prevention manuals.
7. The finding that the insurance field frames employers’ legal risk as uncertain is
similar to prior new institutional studies that conceptualize employment law as
ambiguous (Edelman 1992; Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992). However, in
this case, the uncertainty is generated by the insurance field as opposed to schol-
ars’ interpretation of antidiscrimination laws.
8. Fieldnotes from conferences are on file with author.
9. CPA EmployerGard, Rachel McKinney, Employment Practices Claims Causing
Concerns (on file with author).
10. See http://www.totalhrmanagement.com/services/employment-practices-and-
liability-insurance/epli-insurance (accessed May 23, 2015).
11. E-Risk Services, http://www.hrhelpline.com/erisk/overview (accessed May 23,
2015) on file with author.
12. E-Risk EPL Helpline, https://www.eriskservices.com/E-RiskHELPLINE.asp
(accessed May 23, 2015).
13. See http://www.totalhrmanagement.com/services/employment-practices-and-
liability-insurance/epli-insurance.
14. Obviously, employers remain at risk for paying higher premiums and deductibles,
but EPLI allows employers to shift a significant portion of the risk.
15. Federal law indicates that the purpose of the PIP is to “(1) provide periodic
appraisals of job performance of employees, (2) encourage employee participa-
tion in establishing performance standards, and (3) use the results of performance
appraisals as a basis for training, rewarding, reassigning, promoting, reducing in
grade, retaining, and removing employees” (5 USC§ 4302).
16. I do not mean to suggest employers are incentivized to violate civil rights laws.
Insurers offering EPLI experience rate by adjusting employers’ premiums up or
down to reflect the policyholder’s previous loss experience. Thus, the less dis-
crimination claims an employer has the less premiums the employer will be
charged. However, my point is that insurers offer employers a safety net, and
ultimately, employers would rather pay insurers for defense and indemnification
of such claims than face paying discrimination claims without insurance.
17. See https://www.hrthatworks.com; on file with author.
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18. See https://www.hrthatworks.com; on file with author.
19. See http://www.hrhelpline.com/erisk/overview; on file with author.
20. On file with author.
21. See http://www.hrhelpline.com/erisk/overview; on file with author.
22. On file with author.
23. See https://www.hrthatworks.com; on file with author.
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